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Abstract
We propose a criterion to rank poverty measures on the basis
of distribution-sensitivity. The criterion compares reactions to
‘lossy’ transfers among the poor and is sufficiently general to be
applicable to any pair of poverty measures. We focus specifi-
cally on the class of rank-dependent poverty measures and pro-
vide distribution-sensitivity rankings of the poverty gap ratio, the
first and second Sen measures, the Thon measure, the Shorrocks
measure, and the Thon, Kakwani and S-Gini classes of measures.
Moreover, we discuss the relationship between the proposed cri-
terion and two alternative distribution-sensitivity criteria that di-
rectly apply the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion. Finally, we
provide an empirically tractable necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for unanimous poverty rankings by all continuous and repli-
cation invariant rank-dependent poverty measures exhibiting a
predetermined minimum degree of distribution-sensitivity.
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1 Introduction
In two early contributions, Watts (1968) and Sen (1976) each stressed that
poverty measures should be sensitive to the distribution of income among the
poor. They argued that a given income increment matters more to a worse
off poor individual than to a better off poor individual, and introduced some
of the first modern poverty measures with the specific aim of incorporating
this distributional aspect. The literature on poverty measurement that has
developed since the pioneering contributions of Watts and Sen continues to
recognize distribution-sensitivity as a major concern.1
It is now common to assert that a proper poverty measure should satisfy
at least a minimal degree of distribution-sensitivity, a requirement that usu-
ally comes in the form of a transfer property. But poverty measures typically
go beyond this minimal degree of distribution-sensitivity and, moreover, dif-
fer considerably in the extent to which they go beyond. That is, some poverty
measures generally tolerate greater sacrifices of mean income in return for a
given distributional improvement than others. Although the literature has
since the beginning regarded the degree of distribution-sensitivity as an im-
portant distinguishing factor between poverty measures, a formal definition
of distribution-sensitivity comparisons has long been lacking.2
Zheng (2000a) was the first to provide a solid theoretical foundation
for comparisons of poverty measures on the basis of distribution-sensitivity.
However, Zheng’s distribution-sensitivity criterion, which is based on the
Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion, applies only to the class of subgroup-
consistent poverty measures. This can be considered as a severe limitation:
Zheng’s criterion does not allow distribution-sensitivity comparisons within
the other major class of rank-dependent poverty measures, which includes
important measures proposed by Sen (1976), Thon (1979, 1983), Kakwani
(1980), Shorrocks (1995) and others. Zheng (2000a, p. 135) acknowledges
this limitation and calls for an extension that would allow such comparisons.
The first objective of this paper is to formulate and discuss a new crite-
rion of distribution-sensitivity that can compare also rank-dependent poverty
measures. In line with Okun’s (1975) ‘leaky-bucket experiment’, the pro-
posed criterion compares reactions of poverty measures to ‘lossy’ transfers
among the poor. Consider a transfer in which the better off individual fore-
goes an income amount a+ ` while the worse off receives only an amount a.
1See Chakravarty (2009, Chapter 2), Lambert (2001, Chapter 6), Seidl (1988) and
Zheng (1997) for surveys of this literature.
2The literature often uses the term ‘poverty aversion’ as a synonym for distribution-
sensitivity. However, this is somewhat of a misnomer because it is not the ‘dislike toward
poverty’ that is the issue. See also Zheng (2000a, pp. 120-121).
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The larger the loss ` tolerated by a poverty measure—that is, the larger the
loss ` can be without increasing poverty—the more distribution-sensitive the
measure is considered to be. We demonstrate that the criterion translates
into an easy-to-check condition on the weights of rank-dependent poverty
measures and we use this result to compare the particular measures that
have been proposed in the literature. It turns out that several of the estab-
lished rank-dependent poverty measures can be conclusively ranked by the
distribution-sensitivity criterion. For example, the Sen measure in general
allows larger losses in transferring from better off to worse off than the Thon
measure.
To gain further insight into the proposed distribution-sensitivity criterion,
we compare it with two a priori plausible alternative criteria: a criterion
based on lossy equalizations (creating complete equality among the poor at
the cost of mean income) and Zheng’s criterion. First, we show that the
three criteria coincide on the class of subgroup-consistent poverty measures.
Hence, the lossy transfer criterion and the lossy equalization criterion can be
interpreted as two alternative generalizations of Zheng’s criterion. Second,
we demonstrate that the lossy equalization criterion is stronger than the lossy
transfer criterion for the class of rank-dependent poverty measures. That is,
the lossy equalization criterion ranks each pair of rank-dependent poverty
measures that is ranked by the lossy transfer criterion, but in addition ranks
pairs that are not ranked by the latter. We will argue, however, that at
a conceptual level the lossy transfer criterion better captures the idea of
distribution-sensitivity than the lossy equalization criterion.
The second objective of the paper is to explore unanimous rankings of in-
come distributions by a class of poverty measures exhibiting a predetermined
minimum degree of distribution-sensitivity. This application of the idea of
distribution-sensitivity was suggested by Zheng (2000a), who was in turn in-
spired by Meyer’s (1977) work on minimum risk averse unanimity rankings
in the theory of choice under risk. Zheng examines the idea for the class
of subgroup-consistent poverty measures. We present the complimentary
analysis for the class of continuous and replication invariant rank-dependent
poverty measures. An empirically tractable necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for two income distributions to be ranked by the minimum distribution-
sensitivity unanimity poverty ranking is provided. This unanimity ranking is
moreover argued to be a useful extension of the standard concept of censored
generalized Lorenz dominance.
The next section introduces notation and presents a brief overview of the
rank-dependent poverty measures that have been proposed in the literature.
Section 3 defines the main distribution-sensitivity criterion based on lossy
transfers and applies it to obtain rankings of the established rank-dependent
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poverty measures. In Section 4, we consider the lossy equalization criterion
and Zheng’s criterion and discuss the relationships with the lossy transfer
criterion. Finally, Section 5 discusses unanimity poverty rankings by mea-
sures exhibiting a predetermined minimum degree of distribution-sensitivity.
All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Rank-dependent poverty measures
The income of individual i is a positive real number xi and the income dis-
tribution for a population of n individuals is a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
in Rn++. The set of income distributions for one or more individuals is
X =
⋃
n∈NRn++. For each income distribution x in X, the incomes are or-
dered such that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. The poverty line is an income level z in
Rn++. An individual i is poor if xi < z and non-poor if xi ≥ z. For an income
distribution x in X, we write nx for the number of individuals and qx for the
number of poor individuals. We drop the subscripts in nx and qx whenever
this does not lead to confusion. For an income distribution x in X, we write
xˆ for the censored income distribution (x1, x2, . . . , xq, z, z, . . . , z). A poverty
measure is a function P : X → R. The value P (x) is to be interpreted as
the poverty level associated with income distribution x in X.
A poverty measure P is a rank-dependent poverty measure if, for each
income distribution x in X,
P (x) =
q∑
i=1
wi(q, n)
z − xi
z
, (1)
where w1(q, n) ≥ w2(q, n) ≥ · · · ≥ wq(q, n) > 0.3 All rank-dependent poverty
measures satisfy the focus property (increasing the income of a non-poor
individual does not affect poverty), monotonicity (decreasing the income of a
poor individual increases poverty) and the transfer property (a transfer from
a worse off poor individual to a better off poor individual, such that the latter
does not cross the poverty line, does not decrease poverty). Note that the
latter property already imposes a minimal degree of distribution-sensitivity.
Table 1 presents rank-dependent poverty measures that have been pro-
posed in the literature (first two columns). The poverty gap ratio equates
the weights of all income positions and hence disregards distribution. The
two Sen (1976) measures were introduced with the explicit goal of bringing
in distributional concerns. These two measures, as all subsequent measures
3The form in equation (1) is relative. Multiplication by z gives the absolute form. The
results in this paper are not affected by the choice between these two forms.
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Table 1. Rank-dependent poverty measures
Measure wi(q, n)
wi(q,n)
wj(q,n)
Poverty gap ratio 1
n
1
Sen 2(q+1−i)
(q+1)n
q+1−i
q+1−j
Second Sen 2(q+0.5−i)
qn
q+0.5−i
q+0.5−j
Thon 2(n+1−i)
(n+1)n
n+1−i
n+1−j
Shorrocks 2(n+0.5−i)
n2
n+0.5−i
n+0.5−j
Kakwani class q(q+1−i)
κ
n
∑q
i=1 i
κ , κ ≥ 0
(
q+1−i
q+1−j
)κ
Thon class τn+2−2i
(τ−1)n2 , τ ≥ 2 τn+2−2iτn+2−2j
S-Gini class
(
n+1−i
n
)σ − (n−i
n
)σ
, σ ≥ 1 (n+1−i)σ−(n−i)σ
(n+1−j)σ−(n−j)σ
in the table, feature weights that strictly decrease with the income position.
The Thon (1979) and Shorrocks (1995) measures satisfy a strong transfer
property, which condemns regressive transfers even if the receiver crosses the
poverty line, a property violated by the two Sen measures. The Kakwani
(1980) class of poverty measures is based on the idea that transfers should
have a greater impact on poverty if they take place further down in the
income distribution. The Thon (1983) class, in contrast, reflects the idea
that transfers should have the same impact irrespective of their location.
For the Kakwani class, the poverty gap ratio is obtained for κ = 0 and the
Sen measure for κ = 1. The class of S-Gini poverty measures results from
the combination of the S-Gini social welfare measure (Donaldson and Wey-
mark, 1980) and Chakravarty’s (1983, p. 79) welfare-based poverty measure.
The poverty gap ratio is obtained for σ = 1 and the Shorrocks measure for
σ = 2 (Chakravarty, 1997). A class that further generalizes the S-Gini class
is considered in Section 5.
3 A distribution-sensitivity criterion
To compare poverty measures on the basis of distribution-sensitivity, we com-
pare their reactions to lossy transfers among the poor. Such a transfer in-
creases the income of a worse off poor individual by a given amount, but
decreases the income of a better off poor individual by a greater amount.
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Okun (1975, pp. 91-95) famously suggested the consideration of lossy trans-
fers in order to gauge attitudes toward the tradeoff between the size and
distribution of income.4 Let x and y be two income distributions in X.
Then x is said to be obtained from y by a lossy transfer among the poor if
nx = ny = n, qx = qy = q and
x = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yi + a , . . . , yj − b , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn),
where 0 < a < b and yi < yi + a ≤ yj − b < yj. A poverty measure P is at
least as distribution-sensitive as a poverty measure R if P registers a poverty
reduction for each lossy transfer among the poor for which R does. In other
words, given a transfer that benefits a worse off poor individual at the cost
of a better off poor individual, P tolerates at least as great a loss as R does.
Definition 1. Let P and R be two poverty measures. Then P is at least as
distribution-sensitive as R if R(x) < R(y) implies P (x) < P (y) for all x and
y in X such that x is obtained from y by a lossy transfer among the poor.
We say that P is more distribution-sensitive than R if P is at least as
distribution-sensitive as R and R is not at least as distribution-sensitive as
P . We say that P is equally distribution-sensitive as R if P is at least as
distribution-sensitive as R and R is at least as distribution-sensitive as P .
The criterion in Definition 1 is sufficiently general to be applied to any pair
of poverty measures. We focus specifically on the rank-dependent poverty
measures. The following proposition rephrases distribution-sensitivity judg-
ments in terms of conditions on the weights of rank-dependent poverty mea-
sures.
Proposition 1. Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent poverty measures.
Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) Pw is at least as distribution-sensitive as Pv,
(ii) for all i, j, q and n such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q ≤ n,
wi(q, n)
wj(q, n)
≥ vi(q, n)
vj(q, n)
.
Note that (ii) is equivalent to the condition that, for all q and n such
that q ≤ n, the weight vector (w1(q, n), w2(q, n), . . . , wq(q, n)) dominates the
weight vector (v1(q, n), v2(q, n), . . . , vq(q, n)) in relative differentials (Moyes,
1994, p. 276, Marshall, Olkin and Arnold, 2011, p. 186).
4See also Atkinson (1973, pp. 66-67).
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We now compare the rank-dependent poverty measures defined in the
previous section on the basis of distribution-sensitivity. Condition (ii) can
easily be checked for the weight ratios presented in the final column of Table
1. Using  to denote the relation ‘is more distribution-sensitive than’, the
ranking of the first five measures reads as follows:
Second Sen  Sen  Thon  Poverty gap ratio,5
and
Second Sen  Shorrocks  Thon.
The Sen and Shorrocks measures cannot in general be ranked on the basis
of distribution-sensitivity. However, the Sen measure is more distribution-
sensitive than the Shorrocks measure on the restricted domain of income
distributions with q < n, while the reverse ranking holds on the restricted
domain of income distributions with n = q. The former domain restriction is
obviously more empirically relevant than the latter. Next, the Thon measure
is equally distribution-sensitive as the member of the Thon class for which
τ = 2. Finally, distribution-sensitivity increases with κ for the Kakwani
class, decreases with τ for the Thon class and increases with σ for the S-Gini
class.
4 Two alternative distribution-sensitivity criteria
To put the distribution-sensitivity criterion proposed in the previous section
into perspective, we contrast it with two plausible alternative criteria. These
two criteria have in common that they are direct applications of the Arrow-
Pratt theory of risk aversion, an established source of inspiration for the
analysis of inequality aversion (Lambert, 2001, Chapter 4).
The first alternative criterion compares poverty measures by their reac-
tions to lossy equalizations among the poor. Such an operation equalizes the
incomes of all poor individuals, but diminishes the total income of the poor.
Let x and y be two income distributions in X. Then x is obtained from y by
a lossy equalization among the poor if nx = ny = n, qx = qy = q and
x = (c , c , . . . , c , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn),
where cq <
∑q
i=1 xi. A poverty measure P is at least as distribution-sensitive
as a poverty measure R if P registers a poverty reduction for each lossy equal-
ization among the poor for which R does. Because the criterion measures
5The finding that the Sen measure is more distribution-sensitive than the Thon measure
confirms an intuition expressed by Zheng (2000a, p. 135).
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the maximum income amount that can be sacrificed in exchange for complete
equality, it is an immediate translation of the Arrow-Pratt criterion of risk
aversion to the poverty context.6
Definition 2. Let P and R be two poverty measures. Then P is at least
as distribution-sensitive∗ as R if R(x) < R(y) implies P (x) < P (y) for all x
and y in X such that x is obtained from y by a lossy equalization among the
poor.
The second alternative distribution-sensitivity criterion we consider was
proposed by Zheng (2000a). Zheng focuses exclusively on the subgroup-
consistent poverty measures. A poverty measure P is a subgroup-consistent
poverty measure if, for each income distribution x in X,
P (x) =
1
n
q∑
i=1
pz(xi),
where pz : R++ → R is strictly decreasing on (0, z], continuous and convex,
with pz(t) = 0 for each t ≥ z. In line with the Arrow-Pratt criterion of risk
aversion, Zheng (2000a, Proposition 1) measures distribution-sensitivity by
the ‘degree of convexity’ of the function pz.
Definition 3. Let Pp and Pr be two subgroup-consistent poverty measures.
Then Pp is at least as distribution-sensitive
∗∗ as Pr if there is a convex func-
tion ψ such that pz(t) = ψ(rz(t)) for each t in (0, z].
We first consider how the three criteria in Definitions 1, 2 and 3 compare
subgroup-consistent poverty measures. The following proposition shows that
the three criteria coincide for this class. Hence, the lossy transfer criterion in
Definition 1 and the lossy equalization criterion in Definition 2 can be seen
as two alternative generalizations of Zheng’s criterion in Definition 3.
6The criterion is similar to the formulation of the Arrow-Pratt criterion in Definition
(v) of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 191). Incidentally, note that the criterion
in Definition 2 can be rephrased in terms of the equally distributed equivalent income, the
analogue of the certainty equivalent in the theory of choice under risk. For a poverty
measure P and an income distribution x in X, the equally distributed equivalent income
eP (x) is defined by P (eP (x), eP (x), . . . , eP (x), xq+1, xq+2, . . . , xn) = P (x). The next result
follows easily from Bosmans (2007a, Theorem 1 (a)): for two poverty measures P and R
such that eP (x) and eR(x) exist for each x in X, we have that P is at least as distribution
sensitive∗ as R if and only if eP (x) ≤ eR(x) for each x in X.
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Proposition 2. Let Pp and Pr be two subgroup-consistent poverty measures.
Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i′) Pp is at least as distribution-sensitive as Pr,
(ii′) Pp is at least as distribution-sensitive∗ as Pr,
(iii′) Pp is at least as distribution-sensitive∗∗ as Pr.
Next we consider distribution-sensitivity comparisons of rank-dependent
poverty measures. The following proposition restates the criterion in Defi-
nition 2 in terms of the weights of rank-dependent poverty measures. For
a rank-dependent poverty measure Pw, we write w¯i(q, n) for the normalized
weight wi(q, n)/
∑q
i=1wi(q, n).
Proposition 3. Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent poverty measures.
Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i′′) Pw is at least as distribution-sensitive∗ as Pv,
(ii′′) for all q and n such that 1 ≤ q ≤ n, and for each k = 1, 2, . . . , q,
k∑
i=1
w¯i(q, n) ≥
k∑
i=1
v¯i(q, n).
Condition (ii′′) is equivalent to the condition that, for all q and n such
that q ≤ n, the normalized weight vector (w¯1(q, n), w¯2(q, n), . . . , w¯q(q, n))
is majorized by the normalized weight vector (v¯1(q, n), v¯2(q, n), . . . , v¯q(q, n)).
It follows from Marshall, Olkin and Arnold (2011, Proposition B.1, p. 186)
that condition (ii) of Proposition 1 implies condition (ii′′).7 The reverse
implication does not hold. Hence, for the rank-dependent poverty measures,
the lossy equalization criterion is stronger than the lossy transfer criterion.
That is, each pair of rank-dependent poverty measures ranked by the lossy
transfer criterion is ranked equivalently by the lossy equalization criterion,
and there exist pairs of rank-dependent poverty measures that are ranked by
the latter but not by the former.
We conclude this section by arguing that the lossy transfer criterion better
captures the concept of distribution-sensitivity than the lossy equalization
criterion.
In its minimal form, distribution-sensitivity requires that a small transfer
from a better off poor individual to a worse off poor individual decreases
poverty. We contrast the egalitarian and prioritarian justifications for this
requirement. The egalitarian justification would be that inequality among
7See also Marshall, Olkin and Proschan (1967).
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the poor is in itself ethically undesirable and that the transfer decreases this
inequality. The prioritarian justification does not rely on the intrinsic value
of equality, but rather on the premise that additional units of income matter
more the worse off an individual is (Parfit, 1995): because the transferred
units go from a better to a worse off individual, the overall effect is a de-
crease of poverty. As argued extensively by Esposito and Lambert (2011),
the poverty literature’s interest in distribution-sensitivity seems to be driven
more by a prioritarian attitude than by an egalitarian attitude.
The lossy transfer criterion in Definition 1 captures the prioritarian at-
titude well. By measuring the maximum allowed loss in transferring from a
better off individual to a worse off individual, it directly measures the extent
to which a poverty measure prioritizes the former over the latter.8 The lossy
equalization criterion in Definition 2, on the other hand, is clearly egalitarian
in spirit.9 Moreover, as we have seen, for some pairs of poverty measures P
and R, the criterion concludes that P is more distribution-sensitive than R,
even though R in some cases accepts a greater loss than P in transferring
from the better to the worse off, that is, even though R in some cases gives
more priority to the worse off than P . We conclude therefore that the lossy
transfer criterion better expresses the prioritarian attitude that underlies the
idea of distribution-sensitivity.
5 Minimum distribution-sensitivity poverty rankings
In empirical applications, it is interesting to identify rankings of income dis-
tributions agreed on by an appealing class of poverty measures.10 Such rank-
ings do not depend on the possibly arbitrary properties of any given single
poverty measure and therefore allow drawing robust conclusions. We con-
8A restatement of Definition 1 may clarify this further. Let x be obtained from y by a
lossy transfer from individual j to individual i. Consider now a third income distribution
y′ = (y1, y2, . . . , yi, . . . , yj − b, . . . , yq, yq+1, yq+2, . . . , yn). Starting from y′, the choice
between x and y involves deciding which of the following two operations reduces poverty
more: giving a smaller amount a to the worse off individual i (leading to x), or giving
a greater amount b to the better off individual j (leading to y). This clearly gauges the
extent to which the worse off gets priority over the better off. Note that the intuition that
leads Zheng (2000a, pp. 119-120) to the Arrow-Pratt criterion is also prioritarian in spirit.
Zheng considers the relative difference between, on the one hand, the poverty reduction
caused by giving an income increment d to the worse off poor individual and, on the other
hand, the poverty reduction caused by giving the income increment d to the better off
individual.
9The lossy transfer criterion does not fare so well in egalitarian terms because the effect
of a lossy transfer on inequality is ambiguous. See Seidl (2001) and Lambert and Lanza
(2006).
10See Zheng (2000b) for a survey of the literature on unanimity poverty rankings.
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sider unanimous rankings by a class of rank-dependent poverty measures
exhibiting a predetermined minimum degree of distribution-sensitivity. For
the reason discussed at the end of the previous section, we focus solely on the
lossy transfer distribution-sensitivity criterion in Definition 1. Our discussion
complements Zheng’s (2000a) analysis of minimum distribution-sensitivity
rankings by the subgroup-consistent poverty measures.
We impose the properties continuity (small changes in incomes result
in small changes in poverty) and replication invariance (replications of the
income distribution leave poverty unchanged).11 The set P collects all rank-
dependent poverty measures that satisfy continuity and replication invari-
ance. A poverty measure P is in P if and only if P is in the form of equation
(1) and
wi(q, n) = f
(
n+ 1− i
n
)
− f
(
n− i
n
)
, (2)
where f : [0, 1]→ R is strictly increasing, continuous and convex.12 Because
the weights do not depend on the number of poor individuals q, we will
simplify by writing wi(n) instead of wi(q, n). Note that the class P contains
the S-Gini measures (for f : t 7→ tσ with σ ≥ 1) and hence also the poverty
gap ratio (σ = 1) and the Shorrocks measure (σ = 2).
Let Pw in P be a predetermined poverty measure, to be interpreted as a
desired lower bound on distribution-sensitivity. We are interested in unani-
mous rankings of income distributions by all poverty measures in P at least as
distribution-sensitive as Pw. The following proposition provides a necessary
and sufficient condition on two income distributions for such a unanimous
ranking to hold. The two income distributions under comparison are assumed
to have equal population sizes. Since any two income distributions can be
replicated up to the same population size, this is without loss of generality.13
11The formal definitions of these properties are as follows. A poverty measure P satisfies
continuity if P is continuous as a function of x on X. A poverty measure P satisfies
replication invariance if, for all x and y in X such that nx = kny and x = (y, y, . . . , y)
with k > 1, we have P (x) = P (y). Note that the subgroup-consistent poverty measures,
as defined in the previous section, satify these two properties as well.
12Continuity implies that the weights do not depend on the number of poor individuals.
Given this fact and using replication invariance, equation (2) follows from Ebert (1988,
Theorem 8).
13For a result in the spirit of Proposition 4 in the welfare context, see Cape´au and Ooghe
(2007, Proposition 3). The key difference with the result provided here is that they do not
use a class of welfare measures analogous with P, but rather the class of ‘r-generalized
Ginis’, which do not satisfy replication invariance.
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Proposition 4. Let Pw be a poverty measure in P. Let x and y be two
income distributions in X such that nx = ny = n. Then the following two
conditions are equivalent:
(a) P (x) ≤ P (y) for each poverty measure P in P that is at least as
distribution-sensitive as Pw,
(b) for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − xˆi) ≤
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − yˆi).
Several remarks are in order. First, the unanimous ranking of two income
distributions is preserved if the poverty line is substituted by a lower one.
Clearly, if condition (b) is satisfied for some poverty line z, then it is also
satisfied for all lower poverty lines. Hence, in empirical applications it suffices
if the researcher is able to produce a reasonable upper bound for the poverty
line. This is a convenient property in cases where the poverty line cannot be
unambiguously determined (Atkinson, 1987).
Second, consider the following corollary of Proposition 4 obtained by
choosing Pw equal to the poverty gap ratio, that is, by choosing the lowest
possible lower bound on distribution-sensitivity.
Corollary 1. Let x and y be two income distributions in X such that nx =
ny = n. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
(a′) P (x) ≤ P (y) for each poverty measure P in P,
(b′) for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
k∑
i=1
z − xˆi ≤
k∑
i=1
z − yˆi.
It was shown by Spencer and Fisher (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1997,
1998) and Shorrocks (1998) that (b′) is equivalent to the condition that
P (x) ≤ P (y) for each subgroup-consistent poverty measure P . Condition (b′)
is moreover equivalent to the condition that xˆ generalized Lorenz dominates
yˆ, that is,
∑k
i=1 xˆi ≥
∑k
i=1 yˆi for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Hence, condition (b) of
Proposition 4 can be regarded as a generalization of this concept of censored
generalized Lorenz dominance.14
14Zheng’s (2000a, Proposition 3) analysis of minimum distribution-sensitivity rankings
by the subgroup-consistent poverty measures yields an alternative generalization of cen-
sored generalized Lorenz dominance.
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Third, the question arises under what conditions on two income distribu-
tions x and y in X there exist a Pw in P such that condition (a) of Proposition
4 is satisfied. The next proposition provides an answer. Define the leximin
relation >lex on X as follows: for all income distributions x and y in X, we
have x >lex y if and only if there is a k ≤ n such that xi = yi for each i < k
and xk > yk.
Proposition 5. Let x and y be two income distributions in X such that
xˆ 6= yˆ and nx = ny = n. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
(a′′) there is a poverty measure Pw in P such that P (x) ≤ P (y) for each
poverty measure P in P that is at least as distribution-sensitive as Pw,
(b′′) xˆ >lex yˆ.
For any two income distributions x and y in X, exactly one of the fol-
lowing three is true: xˆ = yˆ, xˆ >lex yˆ or yˆ >lex xˆ. This implies that there
necessarily exists a lower bound on distribution-sensitivity such that x and
y are unanimously ranked by all members of P respecting this lower bound.
Clearly, if xˆ = yˆ, then all poverty measures in P agree that x and y are
equally poor. The cases xˆ >lex yˆ and yˆ >lex xˆ are covered by Proposition 5.
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To conclude, we suggest an empirical approach in which the minimum
distribution-sensitive poverty measure Pw is determined by the data, instead
of by an a priori choice. The idea is to determine the largest class of poverty
measures that unanimously supports a given poverty judgment. For con-
creteness, let Pw be a member of the class of S-Gini poverty measures. For
a given pair of income distributions x and y in X, we then look for the least
distribution-sensitive S-Gini measure Pw—that is, we look for the minimum
value of σ—for which condition (b) in Proposition 4 is satisfied. The re-
sulting value of σ can be interpreted as an indicator of the strength of the
poverty judgment: the lower this minimum value of σ, the larger (in terms of
set inclusion) the class of minimum distribution-sensitive poverty measures
agreeing on the poverty judgment.
Table 2 provides an illustration with five censored income distributions.16
Consider, say, the comparison of x and s. The value of 3.8 indicates that we
have P (s) ≤ P (x) for each poverty measure P in P at least as distribution-
sensitive as the S-Gini measure with σ = 3.8. In addition, further lowering
15Proposition 5 also shows that the leximin relation defined on censored income distribu-
tions can be interpreted as a maximum distribution-sensitive poverty criterion. For closely
related results in the welfare context, see Hammond (1975), Lambert (2001, Theorem 4.4)
and Bosmans (2007b).
16Note that x >lex y >lex s >lex t >lex u. Hence, Proposition 5 implies that Table 2 is
empty below the diagonal.
13
Table 2. Minimum value of σ such that the column income distribution is
unanimously judged at least as poor as the row income distribution
x y s t u
x = (135, 170, 250, z, z) 1.3 3.8 3.0 4.3
y = (130, 130, 300, z, z) - 7.6 4.5 4.9
s = (120, 180, 300, z, z) - - 1.0 3.8
t = (100, 200, 300, z, z) - - - 6.0
u = (100, 180, z, z, z) - - - -
σ results in loss of unanimity. Now consider the comparison of s and t.
The value of 1.0 indicates that P (t) ≤ P (s) for each poverty measure P in
P or, equivalently, that t generalized Lorenz dominates s (see Corollary 1).
For these five income distributions, this would be the only conclusion that
can be drawn using censored generalized Lorenz dominance. This illustrates
the added value of the suggested approach: in addition to detecting cases
of censored generalized Lorenz dominance (σ = 1.0), the approach allows
to conclude, for example, that the poverty judgment for x and y (σ = 1.3)
comes relatively closer in strength to a censored generalized Lorenz domi-
nance judgment than the poverty judgment for t and u (σ = 6.0).
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i)⇒ (ii). Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent
poverty measures. Assume that (i) holds. Seeking a contradiction, assume
that (ii) does not hold. Let i, j, q and n be such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q ≤ n and
wi(q, n)/wj(q, n) < vi(q, n)/vj(q, n). Let y be an income distributions in X
such that qy = q, ny = n and yi < yi+1 ≤ yj−1 < yj < z. Let
x = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yi + a , . . . , yj − b , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn),
where 0 < a < b, yi < yi + a ≤ yi+1 ≤ yj−1 ≤ yj − b < yj and b/a =
vi(q, n)/vj(q, n). Note that x is obtained from y by a lossy transfer among
the poor. Since vi(q, n)a− vj(q, n)b = 0, we have Pv(x) = Pv(y). And since
wi(q, n)a− wj(q, n)b < 0, we have Pw(x) > Pw(y). This contradicts (i).
(ii) ⇒ (i). Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent poverty measures.
Assume that (ii) holds. Let x and y be two income distributions in X such
that x is obtained from y by a lossy transfer among the poor, i.e.,
x = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yi + a , . . . , yj − b , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn),
where 0 < a < b and yi < yi + a ≤ yj − b < yj. Assume the transfer changes
the position of i to i+ k and the position of j to j− `, i.e., yi + a = xi+k and
yj − b = xj−`. We decompose the amount a into k terms, one term for each
position change. That is, a = a0 + a1 + · · · + ak with at = yi+t − yi+t−1 for
each t = 0, 1, . . . , k− 1 and ak = xi+k − yi+k−1. We decompose the amount b
into ` terms, one term for each position change. That is, b = b0 + b1 + · · ·+ b`
with bt = yj−t+1− yj−t for each t = 0, 1, . . . , `− 1 and b` = yj−`+1−xj−`. We
have Pv(x)− Pv(y) < 0 if and only if
vi(q, n)a0 + vi+1(q, n)a1 + · · · + vi+k(q, n)ak
− (vj−`(q, n)b` + vi+1(q, n)b`−1 + · · · + vj(q, n)b0) > 0.
Since (ii) holds, we have
(wi(q, n) , wi+1(q, n) , . . . , wj(q, n))
= (βivi(q, n) , βi+1vi+1(q, n) , . . . , βjvj(q, n)),
where βi ≥ βi+1 ≥ · · · ≥ βj ≥ 0. Moreover, at ≥ 0 for each t = 0, 1, . . . , k
and bt ≥ 0 for each t = 0, 1, . . . , `. Therefore, Pv(x) − Pv(y) < 0 implies
Pw(x)− Pw(y) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i′) ⇒ (iii′). Let Pp and Pr be two subgroup-
consistent poverty measures. Assume that (i′) holds. Seeking a contradiction,
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assume that (iii′) does not hold. Because pz and rz are continuous and strictly
decreasing, there is a continuous and strictly increasing function ψ such that
pz(t) = ψ(rz(t)) for each t in (0, z]. Since (iii
′) does not hold, there is an
interval [rz(t), rz(s)], with s < t < z, on which ψ is strictly concave. Note
that this implies that rz is strictly convex on [s, t]. Let a and b be such that
0 < a < b, s < s+ a ≤ t− b < t and
rz(s) − rz(s+ a) = rz(t− b) − r(t). (3)
Such a and b exist because rz is strictly convex on [s, t]. Since ψ is strictly
concave on [rz(t), rz(s)] and rz(s) > rz(s+ a) ≥ rz(t− b) > rz(t), we have
pz(s) − pz(s+ a) < pz(t− b) − pz(t). (4)
Let x and y be two income distributions in X such that
y = (y1 , y2 , . . . , t , . . . , s , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn)
and
x = (y1 , y2 , . . . , t+ a , . . . , s− b , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn).
Then x is obtained from y by a lossy transfer among the poor. Using equa-
tions (3) and (4), we obtain Pp(x) > Pp(y) and Pr(x) = Pr(y). This contra-
dicts (i′).
(iii′)⇒ (i′). Let Pp and Pr be two subgroup-consistent poverty measures.
Let x and y be two income distributions in X such that x is obtained from
y by a lossy transfer among the poor, i.e.,
x = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yi + a , . . . , yj − b , . . . , yq , yq+1 , yq+2 , . . . , yn),
where 0 < a < b and yi < yi + a ≤ yj − b < yj. Let Pr(x) < Pr(y). This
implies
rz(yi) − rz(yi + a) > rz(yj − b) − rz(yi).
If (iii′) holds, then there is a strictly increasing and convex function ψ such
that pz(t) = ψ(rz(t)) for each t in (0, z]. Since rz(yi) > rz(yi + a) ≥ rz(yj −
b) > r(yj), we have
ψ(rz(yi)) − ψ(rz(yi + a)) > ψ(rz(yj − b)) − ψ(rz(yj)).
Hence, Pp(x) < Pp(y).
(ii′) ⇔ (iii′). This follows easily from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(1995, Proposition 6.C.2, p. 191).
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Proof of Proposition 3. For a rank-dependent poverty measure Pw and an
x in X, the equally distributed equivalent income is ew(x) =
∑q
i=1 w¯i(q, n)xi.
Note that, for all x and y in X such that nx = ny and qx = qy, we have
Pw(x) ≤ Pw(y) if and only if ew(x) ≥ ew(y).
(i′′) ⇒ (ii′′). Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent poverty measures.
Assume that (i′′) holds. Seeking a contradiction, assume that (ii′′) does not
hold. Let k, q and n be such that 1 ≤ k < q ≤ n and
k∑
i=1
w¯i(q, n) <
k∑
i=1
v¯i(q, n). (5)
Let x be an income distribution in X such that nx = n and qx = q. Moreover,
let xi = α for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k and xi = β for each i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , q,
with α < β. Let y be an income distribution in X such that
y = (c , c , . . . , c , xq , xq+1 , . . . , xn),
where
c = α
k∑
i=1
w¯i(q, n) + β
q∑
i=k+1
w¯i(q, n) − γ
with γ > 0. Then y is obtained from x by a lossy equalization among the
poor. We have ew(x) = c + γ and ew(y) = c. Hence, Pw(x) < Pw(y). Using
equation (5), we obtain ev(x) < c+ γ. We also have ev(y) = c. Hence, for a
sufficiently small γ > 0, we have ev(x) < ev(y). Then Pv(x) > Pv(y). This
contradicts (i′′).
(ii′′) ⇒ (i′′). Let Pw and Pv be two rank-dependent poverty measures.
Assume that (ii′′) holds. Then we have ew(x) ≥ ev(x) for each x in X. Let
x and y be two income distributions in X such that x is obtained from y
by a lossy equalization among the poor. Then we have ew(x) = ev(x) and
ew(y) ≤ ev(y). Hence, Pv(x) < Pv(y) implies Pw(x) < Pw(y).
Proof of Proposition 4. (a)⇒ (b). Let Pw be a poverty measure in P . Let
x and y be two income distributions in X such that nx = ny = n. Assume
that (a) holds. Seeking a contradiction, assume that (b) does not hold. Let
k be such that
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − xˆi) >
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − yˆi). (6)
Since Pw is in P , we have wi(m) = f((m + 1 − i)/m) − f((m − i)/m),
where f is strictly increasing, continuous and convex. Define Pv as vi(m) =
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g((m+ 1− i)/m)− g((m− i)/m) with
g(t) =

αf(t) for each t ≤ n− k
n
,
f(t)− β for each t ≥ n− k
n
,
where 0 < α < 1 and β = (1 − α)f((n − k)/n). The function g is strictly
increasing, continuous and convex. Hence, Pv is in P .
We will now show that Pv is more distribution-sensitive than Pw, i.e., for
all i, j and m such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
vi(m)
vj(m)
≥ wi(m)
wj(m)
. (7)
Note that
m− j
m
<
m+ 1− j
m
≤ m− i
m
<
m+ 1− i
m
,
which means that there are five possible cases for the position of (n− k)/n.
– Case 1, n−k
n
≤ m−j
m
: Then vi(m) = wi(m) and vj(m) = wj(m). Hence,
equation (7) holds with equality.
– Case 2, m−j
m
< n−k
n
≤ m+1−j
m
: Then vi(m) = wi(m). In addition,
vj(m) = f
(
m+ 1− j
m
)
− β − αf
(
m− j
m
)
< wj(m)
because β > (1− α)f((m− j)/m). Hence, equation (7) holds strictly.
– Case 3, m+1−j
m
< n−k
n
≤ m−i
m
: Then vi(m) = wi(m) and vj(m) =
αwj(m) < wj(m). Hence, equation (7) holds strictly.
– Case 4, m−i
m
< n−k
n
< m+1−i
m
: Then vj(m) = αwj(m) < wj(m). In
addition,
vi(m) = f
(
m+ 1− i
m
)
− β − αf
(
m− i
m
)
> wi(m)
because β < (1 − α)f((m+ 1− i)/m). Hence, equation (7) holds
strictly.
– Case 5, m+1−i
m
≤ n−k
n
: Then vi(m) = αwi(m) and vj(m) = αwj(m).
Hence, equation (7) holds with equality.
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We have established that Pv is in P and that Pv is more distribution-
sensitive than Pw. Hence, (a) implies Pv(x) ≤ Pv(y), i.e.,
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − xˆi) + α
n∑
i=k+1
wi(n) (z − xˆi)
≤
k∑
i=1
wi(n) (z − yˆi) + α
n∑
i=k+1
wi(n) (z − yˆi),
which, for sufficiently small α > 0, contradicts (6).
(b)⇒ (a). Let Pw be a poverty measure in P . Let x and y be two income
distributions in X such that nx = ny = n. Assume that (b) holds. We have∑k
i=1wi(n)xˆi ≥
∑k
i=1wi(n)yˆi for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n. This is equivalent
to the condition that the vector wx = (w1(n)xˆ1, w2(n)xˆ2, . . . , wn(n)xˆn) is
weakly supermajorized by the vector wy = (w1(n)yˆ1, w2(n)yˆ2, . . . , wn(n)yˆn)
(Marshall, Olkin and Arnold, 2011, Definition A.2, p. 12). Let Pv be an
arbitrary poverty measure in P that is at least as distribution-sensitive as
Pw. Then Pv(x) =
∑q
i=1 αiwi(n)(z − xi)/z with α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αn > 0.
Note that ϕ : Rn++ → R : t 7→
∑n
i=1 αiti is an increasing and Schur-concave
function. Because wx is weakly supermajorized by wy, we have ϕ(wx) ≥
ϕ(wy) (Marshall, Olkin and Arnold, 2011, Theorem A.8, p. 87). It follows
that Pv(x) ≤ Pv(y).
Proof of Proposition 5. (a′′) ⇒ (b′′). Let x and y be two income dis-
tributions in X such that xˆ 6= yˆ and nx = ny = n. Assume that (a′′)
holds. Seeking a contradiction, assume that (b′′) does not hold, i.e., yˆ >lex xˆ.
Let k ≤ n be such that xˆi = yˆi for each i < k and yˆk > xˆk. We have∑k
i=1wi(n)(z − xˆi) >
∑k
i=1wi(n)(z − yˆi) for each poverty measure Pw in P .
Applying Proposition 4, we obtain a contradiction.
(b′′) ⇒ (a′′). Let x and y be two income distributions in X such that
xˆ 6= yˆ and nx = ny = n. Assume that (b′′) holds. Let k ≤ n be such that
xˆi = yˆi for each i < k and xˆk > yˆk. Let Pw be a rank-dependent poverty
measure with a weight function in the form of equation (2) and
f(t) =

αt for each t ≤ n− k
n
,
t− (1− α)(n− k)
n
for each t ≥ n− k
n
,
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where 0 < α < 1. Then
wi(n) =

1
n
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
α
n
for each i = k + 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, Pw is in P since f is strictly increasing, continuous and convex.
Note that
∑k
i=1 z − xˆi <
∑k
i=1 z − yˆi. Hence, choosing α > 0 sufficiently
small, we get
1
n
k∑
i=1
z − xˆi + α
n
∑`
i=k+1
z − xˆi < 1
n
k∑
i=1
z − yˆi + α
n
∑`
i=k+1
z − yˆi
for each ` = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n. Using Proposition 4, we obtain (a′′).
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